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Southwest had succeeded where others had failed by passionately pursuing both low cost and high customer touch. Low-cost tickets attracted passengers; extraordinary customer service kept them coming back. Staffed with energetic employees, Southwest developed a culture for making flying fun. Southwest executives told employees to do what was best for the customer, and management rewarded individuals for going out of their way to enhance the customer experience. Friendly staff, personalized letters, and proactive problem resolution were the norm.
Despite its success, Southwest faced a challenging competitive landscape. JetBlue was leading a wave of new, innovative, low-cost 1 Based on DOT statistics on passengers enplaned at all United States cities, for 2006. Further details available at http://www.transtats.bts.gov/carriers.asp.
competitors; established airlines were winning labor concessions that increasingly allowed them to compete on the basis of price; and the benefits of Southwest's industry-leading fuel hedging practices would gradually erode. To address these challenges, management was positioning the company to drive both cost and customer service benefits from information technology.
The reliance on technology represented a significant departure from Southwest's past. Early on, the company had eschewed information technology because it was too expensive:
"Back in the '70s, technology wasn't low cost, plus it was very experimental, so we had only what we absolutely needed. I mean, we had cash register tickets, literally. You didn't get a ticket like you got from the other airlines; you got a cash register receipt that showed you paid $35. And it didn't even say 'from' or 'to.' It just had a flight number on it." -Colleen Barrett President and Corporate Secretary
Management had also been concerned that reliance on technology was contrary to Southwest's passion for customer service, which emphasized the importance of personal touch. Thus, Southwest sometimes chose to distinguish itself from other airlines by not investing in technology: Southwest's history of profitability was partly due to having the lowest operating costs, on a seats-per-mile basis, of all the major airlines. Several factors contributed to their low-cost structure, including the use of a single aircraft type, a high-utilization point-to-point route structure, and a fuel hedging program that protected the company from the full impact of rising fuel costs. 4 Management also attributed its low-cost advantage to hardworking, innovative, highly productive employees. South-west's 32,600 employees, 82% of whom were covered by collective bargaining agreements, owned more than 10% of the company's stock.
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These employees had gradually built a very different airline: no first class service; no seat assignments; no executive lounge; no drink carts (drinks were served from trays); boarding on a first-come, first-served basis; flight attendants wearing sports clothes and telling jokes. Its lack of perks did not diminish (and perhaps enhanced) the company's reputation for great customer service. As of 1987, Southwest consistently received the fewest complaints per passenger of the major US carriers.
6 Management insisted on satisfied, productive employees, and its efforts to sustain momentum ranged from the company's annual costume contest on Halloween to its strict recruitment policies: . Management viewed these objectives as interconnected, in that financial success depended on operating efficiency and customer satisfaction, and both of these were dependent on dedicated, empowered, happy employees. Thus, most business initiatives had to satisfy all four objectives-positive financial impact, simultaneous improvements in productivity and customer satisfaction, and employee buy in of the initiative.
Information Technology at Southwest
Despite Southwest's low-tech profile, the company's innovative spirit and survival instincts drove it to develop several strategic applications of information technology. In the mid-1980s, the major airline reservations systems raised fees, effectively squeezing out smaller players. In response, Southwest developed its own reservation system. This reservation system evolved into the industry's first ticketless system, which eliminated the need to print and process paper tickets altogether.
In March 1995, the marketing department launched Southwest.com. A year later Southwest became the first airline to sell tickets on its website. Offshoots of Southwest.com for busin-esses (SWABIZ.com) and Spanish-speaking customers were also industry firsts. In 2002, the airline introduced kiosks for self-service checkin, in large part to alleviate the long lines that resulted from post 9/11 security initiatives. By 2006, more than 70% of passenger revenue was generated by Southwest.com, which had become the most frequently visited airline website. In addition, more than 50% of customers were relying on Southwest.com or kiosks to check themselves in for their flights.
Southwest embraced the cost savings resulting from customer self-service. Perhaps more importantly, management recognized that selfservice technology actually improved the customer experience: 
Building a Technology Foundation
Before Southwest Technology could support a business transformation, it had to fix existing technologies and systems that were broken. System outages were common in 2002. In 2003, the reservation system went down for two hours. Accordingly, early efforts focused on immediate fixes of the company's technical vulnerabilities. The Technology unit fixed problems with key applications, implemented a new testing methodology, and addressed needs like power, redundancy, and backup.
After approximately 18 months of fixing the worst offenders, Technology leaders could turn their attention to reducing the technology silos that had proliferated in the infrastructure. A key element of this effort was to standardize the core infrastructure technologies. Towards this end, the infrastructure services team identified what they called "styles and stacks." The styles equated to types of applications (e.g., transactional, historical, analytical) and the stacks identified the technology components and development tools that supported each style.
As long as a development team could meet its objectives with a standard stack, they could quickly get to work on delivering a solution. If the standard stack did not meet the needs of a particular project, the leader would work out a solution with the architecture working group. The architecture working group, which was headed by CTO Kerry Schwab, attempted to balance the need to enforce standards with the need to meet project requirements: Schwab's Technology Infrastructure organization was also working to reduce baseline costs. Technology teams renegotiated contracts with vendors, standardized desktops (while outsourcing some commodity processes to their desktop provider), implemented a desktop refresh plan to reduce desktop support costs, and analyzed help desk calls to identify needed fixes to applications. These efforts cut baseline IT costs by about 10%, freeing up resources for more strategic needs.
As infrastructure technologies became more reliable and cost-effective, Technology turned its attention to providing needed business integration capabilities. They focused on Southwest's "sacred transactions"-those transactions capturing core operating data across the company. Management recognized that Southwest's internally developed reservation system was at the heart of the company's sacred transactions and that it had become outdated. In 2005, Southwest initiated a two-year project to rewrite its reservation system and redesign key files associated with its sacred transactions.
Implementing IT Governance
Even as Technology leaders worked on fixing the Technology unit and rationalizing the technology infrastructure, they sought to engage business managers in the transformation effort. While some positive impacts could be delivered by making improvements within Technology, management agreed that business leaders had to define their IT priorities and ultimately drive organizational change. This started with an education process: The early period of "Technology-push" helped Southwest introduce improvements in IT infrastructure and some core systems around the booking engine, crew scheduling, internet-based customer service, and employee benefits. Over time, however, ownership of change initiatives started to move back to business leaders: Another project focused on customer relationship management. Like Redefining Excellence, this project was an umbrella project involving multiple systems and process changes, implemented incrementally. Customer relations staff had 40 icons on their computers; all representing systems that could potentially help them address a customer need or resolve a customer complaint. The objective was to eventually collapse those isolated systems into a single modular system with all the capabilities accessible via a single icon. Some of the new functionality would also enable additional customer self-service, as the same features could be exposed on Southwest.com or the airport kiosks. For example, one feature converted vouchers from paper (which had to be cashed in at an airport) to an electronic form (which could be cashed in online).
As Southwest implemented components of the customer relationship management project, demands on customer relations staff eased and they could resolve customer issues faster. To ensure that Technology made Southwest more-not less-agile, senior executives had 8 The 10-minute turn referred to the amount of time taken to empty and fill a Southwest plane at a gate. Gary Kelly referred to the 10-minute turn as an outcome of the "warrior spirit of our employees" responding to the need, in Southwest's early days, to make three airplanes do the work of four. (Gary Kelly speech to Houston Forum, October 27, 2004.) worked to (1) focus attention on the company's highest priorities for Technology support, (2) get needed systems in quickly, and then (3) drive the value from them. They had made enormous progress on the first two, but driving value from systems was still a challenge: Looking ahead, management could see significant challenges to Southwest's successful business model. As traditional carriers sought to compete on price and new entrants introduced amenities not available on Southwest, the company was assessing its opportunities to grow profitably. Many of the most obvious opportunities to grow challenged the principles on which Southwest had built their airline. For example, Southwest was steadily moving toward longer routes. Moving from short haul to longer routes increased demand for food on board and led to more checked bags.
9 Both developments could impede the rapid turnaround of planes and increase the company's ratio of employees per plane.
In 2006, Southwest had entered its first codeshare agreement with ATA Airlines. Management saw codesharing as an opportunity for rapid growth. But, because other airlines assigned seats, Southwest was not yet posi-tioned for significant codesharing. International flights, through codeshares or new Southwest routes were also a possibility. However, international flights would require the ability to store passport information. Southwest could also move into smaller U.S. cities. But smaller markets could not support the company's standard plane, the Boeing 737, and smaller planes would add complexity to its operations.
In the short term Southwest had ordered 37 new 737s for delivery in 2007 which would increase seating capacity 8 percent. This would allow the company to achieve some growth by simply pushing the existing business model. 
